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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law: The Requirement of Announcement of
Authority and Purpose Before Breaking into a Home by Police
Officers-California law enforcement officers acting on information
and observation, substantiated by the word of a reliable informer, ar-
rested George Ker without a warrant for the possession of marijuana
in violation of section 11530 of the California Health and Safety Code.
The state officers obtained the pass key to the Ker apartment from
the building manager. Proceeding quietly, the officers unlocked and
opened the door to the apartment. After entrance to the Ker apartment,
the officers announced their authority and purpose and placed the de-
fendant under arrest. Proceeding without a search warrant, the officers
searched the apartment and discovered various amounts of marijuana.
The defendants were subsequently convicted and the California
District Court of Appeals affirmed.' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari,2 and upheld the decision of the court of appeals by
a 5-4 decision. Ker v. California.3
Eight of the justices concurred in Part I of the opinion written by
Justice Clark, which dealt with the standard by which state searches
and seizures must be evaluated, reiterating the rule established in Mapp
v. Ohio.4 In Mapp, the Court specifically held that the rule established
in Boyd v. United States,5 which prohibited the use of testimony and
papers obtained through unreasonable search and seizures by the Fed-
eral Government in a criminal proceeding, was enforceable against the
states under the fourteenth amendment. It was pointed out that Mapp
established no assumption by the Court of supervisory powers over
state courts, (a highly unlikely interpretation of the Court's decision),
and "did not attempt the impossible task of laying down a fixed formula
for the application in specific cases of the constiutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Courts will be met with
recurring questions as to the reasonableness of searches, and "at any
rate reasonableness is in the first instance for the trial court to deter-
mine. ' 7 Only Justice Harlan dissented as to the standard to be applied;
he would judge state searches and seizures by the more flexible con-
cept of fundamental fairness and of rights 'basic to a free society,'
embraced in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. View-
ing the case in this manner, he voted to affirm the conviction.
Mr. Justice Clark, in applying the standard laid out in Part I of his
1 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1961).2 368 U.S. 974 (1962).
3-U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623 (1963).
4367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6 Ker v. California, supra note 1, at 1629.7 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4, at 653.
RECENT DECISIONS
opinion, found that the federal requirement of reasonableness con-
tained in the fourth amendment was not violated in this case. Justices
Black, Stewart and White joined him in this conclusion. Finding that
the arrest was based upon sufficient probable cause, the Court concluded
that the lawfulness of the arrest was not vitiated by the method of
entry. Section 844 of the California Penal Code permits officers to
break into a dwelling after demanding admittance and explaining their
purpose." Though this requirement was not met, the California court
held that the circumstances of the arrest came within the provisions of
a judicial exception engrafted upon the statute,9 to wit, the presence
of exigent circumstances which justified non-compliance with the
statute. The exigent circumstances in this case were: (1) that through
experience, arresting officers had found that announcement of authority
and purpose led to the destruction of evidence, and (2) Ker's furtive
conduct in eluding the officers shortly before the arrest.10 The law-
fulness of the arrests of state officers is to be determined by reference
to state law, in so far as it is non-violative of the Federal Constitution.
The Court concluded that no such offensiveness was present.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, in which Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Douglas and Goldberg joined, viewed the arrest
of George Ker as illegal owing to the unannounced intrusion of the
arresting officers, announcement being a mandate of the fourth amend-
ment. In reviewing the recognized exceptions to the announcement of
authority and purpose requirement, the Court concluded that no such
circumstances, as would lead to the dispensation of the requirement,
were present in this case. Finding the arrest unlawful and violative of
the fourth amendment, the minority held that the subsequently seized
evidence should have been excluded under the rule of the Mapp case.
The requirement that officers announce their authority and purpose
before they may lawfully break the door of a house has long been em-
bedded in the tradition of Anglo-American law. Its origin can be
traced back some five hundred years to the 13th Yearbook of Edward
the IV and was pronounced in 1603 in Semayne's Case: "In all cases
where the king is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party's house.... But before he breaks it, he ought to signify
the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors."" A cen-
tury later, England's leading commentators on criminal law, Hale and
8 CAL. PEN. CoDE §844 (1872). "To make an arrest, ... in all cases a peace
officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person
to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him
to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which
admittance is desired."
9 People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630, 304 P. 2d 175 (1956), People v. Maddox,
46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
10 Ker v. California, supra note 1, at 1633.
11 Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rpr. 194 (1603).
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Hawkins, reaffirmed the principle recognized in Semayne's Case.12
This common law principle was carried over to the colonies and
today is reflected in the provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 3109,13 as well
as in the statutes of a large number of states,' 4 and in the American Law
Institute's proposed Code of Criminal Procedure, section 28.' 5 Excep-
tions to this general requirement have been recognized by a few states,
though there appear to be no English decisions which clearly recognize
any exceptions. The two leading state cases are Read v. Case,'6 which
allowed officers to dispense with the requirement of announcement when
they, in good faith, believe that they or someone within, are in peril of
bodily harm, and People v. Maddax,17 which held that announcement
was not required when the person to be arrested is fleeing or attempting
to destroy evidence. The earliest recognized exception appears to deal
with the cases of an escape after arrest for a felony, when the of-
ficer is in fresh pursuit.' 8
The only previous Supreme Court case which had concerned itself
with the requirement of authority and purpose by officers was Miller
v. United States.19 In the Miller case, the Court dealt with an arrest
without a warrant by a metropolitan officer of the District of Columbia
for violation of a federal narcotics law. Local officers were required
to make an announcement of authority and purpose under a rule laid
down in Acarino v. United States.Y° In Miller, the Court, in dealing with
a situation which appeared to require the application of a local rule of
law, stated that the validity of the entry to execute the arrest must be
tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. section
3109, which deals with entry by federal officers to execute a search
warrant. The Court proceeded to give the common law history of the
requirement of announcement of authority and purpose embodied in
provisions of section 3109. In emphasizing the historical importance of
the rule dealing with unannounced entries, the Court stated that "the
12 1 HALE, PL.As OF THE CROWN 583 (1736); see also 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN §1 (6th ed. 1787).
13 18 U.S.C. §3109 (1948). "The officer may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute
a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in
the execution of the warrant."14 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §155 (1958) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. §62-1819 (1868) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. §629.34 (1927) ; WYO. COMP. STAT. §10-309 (1876).
15 CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §28 (1930). "Right of officer to break into building. An
officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when
authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, as provided
in section 21, may break open a door or window of any building in which
the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused
admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose."
16 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
17 Note 9 supra.
Is Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 541, 798, 804 (1924).
19 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
20 179 F. 2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing
entrance into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not
be given grudging application."2 1
The broad language utilized by the Court in Miller would lead one
to believe that the Court was not in fact applying a local rule of law,
but extending the requirements of the provisions of section 3109 to
cover arrests, as well as the execution of search warrants, and holding
that any evidence obtained in violation of the criteria embodied in the
statute would be excluded from federal courts through the exercise of
the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over federal courts. This in-
terpretation of the Miller case has been adopted by at least one lower
federal district court.2 2 The Ker case appears to leave little doubt that
the Court in Miller through the exercise of its supervisory powers, laid
down the rule that evidence obtained through an unannounced entry
into a home by officers in making an arrest or in executing a search
warrant, would be excluded by federal courts. Justice Clark, in the
majority opinion of Ker, states (obiter) that Miller required the exclu-
sion of evidence because of the violation of a federal statute (section
3109). Since Miller was concerned with an arrest without a warrant
by local officers, section 3109 could not have been violated unless the
Court was extending its scope under its supervisory powers. In the
dissent in Ker, justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in
Miller, states that Miller rested upon an exercise of the Court's super-
visory powers. The Court in Miller refused to pass upon whether the
unqualified requirements of the rule would admit of an exception due
to exigent circumstances.
In Ker, the Court was dealing with an arrest.by state officers and
the use of the evidence obtained therefrom in a state prosecution. The
majority, in finding no violation of constitutional standards, failed to
clarify the basis for their decision. Since California has a statute requir-
ing announcement of authority and purpose before breaking,23 the ma-
jority could have decided the case merely with reference to state law by
finding that the application of the state law was not violative of con-
stitutional standards. This logic prevents the conclusion that announce-
ment of authority and purpose before making arrests will be required
of all state officers, especially where the state law has no statutory re-
quirement prohibiting unannounced entries. The other possible basis
for the decision expressed by Justice Clark is that the California statute
complies with the commands of the fourth amendment, and that the
exigent circumstances recognized by the California court, which justify
noncompliance with the California statute, would also justify non-
compliance with the dictates of the fourth amendment. Justice Clark's
21 Miller v. United States, supra note 19, at 313.
22United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Penn. 1962).
23 CAL. PEN. CODE §844, supra note 8. ,
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
discussion of the common law exceptions to the requirement lends
force to the latter interpretation. If the majority were deciding the
case purely with reference to state law, such a discussion would not
be required and the Court would merely have had to look to the per-
tinent California decisions on the question. If this is in fact the founda-
tion of the Court's decision, it would appear that the recognized ex-
ceptions to an "unqualified" rule, as it was termed in Miller, would take
force and vitality from such rule. The past experience of an officer as
to destruction of evidence would then lead to a complete dispensation
of the requirement in all such future cases. The furtive conduct of Ker
in eluding the officers, referred to by the majority, was a turnabout he
made while being followed by the officers. A turnabout certainly seems
to be ambiguous conduct under the circumstances, since there was a
complete absence of any indication that Ker knew he was being fol-
lowed. It is hardly a firm basis for the invoking of the "fresh pursuit"
exception to the requirement.
The minority, in holding that an unannounced entry is violative of
the fourth amendment, emphasized the importance of the privacy of
the home, which has traditionally been protected. justice Brennan
enunciates three exceptions to the general requirement: (1) where the
persons within already know of the presence of the officers and their
purpose, (2) where there is a justifiable belief that persons within are
in peril of great bodily harm, and (3) where those within, who are
aware of the presence of officers, are engaged in activity which would
lead to a reasonable belief that evidence was being destroyed. None of
these exceptions violate the rationale of the doctrine, which seeks to
protect citizens from unannounced intrusions, since the intrusions are
not in effect "unannounced"-the occupant being aware of someone's
presence and intent to enter.
Strong policy arguments would militate against further extension
of the exceptions recognized by Justice Brennan. In allowing previous
experience and ambiguous conduct to serve as a basis for dispensing
with the requirement of announcement of authority and purpose, vio-
lence would be done to the presumption of innocence with which an
accused is cloaked. "Indeed, the violence is compounded by another
assumption, also necessarily involved, that a suspect to whom an officer
first makes known his presence will further violate the law.' '24 Practical
hazards involved in law enforcement would also contradict a relaxation
of the announcement requirement. Cases of mistaken identity and mis-
information as to an address could lead to fright and embarrassment
on the part of householders. Danger to the life of the police officer
himself militates against a lax rule. In Miller, the Court pointed out
that compliance with the federal notice statute "is also a safeguard for
24 Ker v. California, supra note 1, at 1641.
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the police themselves who might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot
down by fearful householders."2 5 Such a requirement apparently has
not been a millstone around the neck of federal officers, nor would it
appear to create serious obstacles to law enforcement.
In summary, Ker seems to clarify the basis for the Court's decision
in Miller. It now appears that evidence obtained in violation of the
provisions of section 3109, extended to cover arrests, whether by fed-
eral or state officers, will lead to the exclusion of that evidence in a
federal court proceeding. Whether all state officers will be required
to give announcement of authority and purpose before making arrests,
in order to utilize subsequently obtained evidence in a state prosecu-
tion, is still unclear. If the majority in the future clearly states that
announcement of authority and purpose is required by the fourth
amendment, the Court will still be evenly divided as to the circumstances
which would justify a non-compliance with the announcement require-
ment. Justice Harlan, utilizing a completely independent test of 'funda-
mental fairness,' prevents, for the time being, a clear cut decision of
the Court in this troubled area.
WYLIE A. AITKEN
Bankruptcy: Title of a Trustee to a Bankrupt's Cause of Action
for Personal Injuries-Stephen LeRoy Buda, while a passenger in
an automobile, sustained personal injuries as a result of an accident.
Without commencing an action against his tortfeasor, he filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy three months after the accident. Buda's per-
sonal injury claim was settled by his attorney, with the stipulation of
the trustee, for $1,200.00, which, after expenses were paid, left a
balance of $560.00. The referee, interpreting section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, held that the bankrupt's cause of action did not vest
in the trustee. The referee's decision was affirmed in the district court
and by the circuit court of appeals." Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act
states:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or suc-
cessors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification,
shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a
proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property
which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of
property wherever located . . . (1) ... (2) . . . (3) . . . (4)
... (5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the
filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial proc-
ess against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered:
Provided, That rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander,
25 Miller v. United States, supra note 19, at 313.
1 In re Buda, CCH BANKt. L. REP. §60,954 (1963).
